In-kind price subsidies are a new and important feature of U.S. agricultural policy. Yet the market effects of such subsidies have not been widely discussed in the professional literature even through they differ importantly from […]
A Comparison of Tariffs and Quotas in a Strategic Setting
We model the situation where two large countries impose either tariffs or quotas and a third large country remains passive. The introduction of the third country overturns results from two-country models. Stable quota equilibria are […]
Targeted and Global Export Subsidies and Welfare Impacts
A three-country model of export subsidies is developed with an exporter, an importer, and a third country, representing the rest of the world, that can act on either side of the market. The welfare effect […]
Who Determines Farm Programs? Agribusiness and the Making of Farm Policy
Political-economic analyses of the causes and consequences of agricultural commodity policies typically emphasize farmer and consumer (taxpayer) interests and underplay the role of agribusiness. A more complete understanding of agricultural policy requires paying attention to […]
Report of ESCOP Subcommittee on Domestic and International Markets and Policy
Does Arbitraging Matter? Spatial Trade Models and Discriminatory Trade Policies
When modeling discriminatory trade policies — such as targeted embargoes, selective quotas, targeted export or import subsidies, or preferential trading agreements — failure to explicitly include assumptions about arbitraging behavior may yield to misleading results. […]
Export Supply and Import Demand Elasticities in the Japanese Textile Industry: A Production Theory Approach
Agricultural goods are often treated as final goods in applied agricultural trade models. However, many agricultural traded goods are intermediate in nature. In this paper a production theory approach is applied in deriving export supply […]
The Welfare Effects of Imperfect Harmonization of Trade and Industrial Policy
Partial cooperation in setting trade policy may be worse than no cooperation for countries who form a customs union. The paper investigates three situations where this is likely to occur. First, if the countries forming […]